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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLADYS E. HAMILTON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORA-
TION, KENNETH J. PINNEY, 
doing business as PINNEY BEV-
ERAGE COMPANY, and PROVO 





APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Appellant brought this action against the Respond-
ents above named in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County to recover damages for injuries received by her 
by reason of her having been struck by a baseball on 
the 9th day of July, 1947, during a game then being 
played in Derk's Field between a baseball team known 
as the Pinney Beverage Company Team and the Provo 
City Baseball Team.· 
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Prior to this appeal, upon Plaintiff's motion the 
action was dismissed as to Defendant Kenneth J. Pinney, 
doing business as Pinney Beverage Company and the 
Defendant Provo City Baseball Club, leaving the De-
fendant, Salt Lake City Corporation the sole Respon-
dent herein. (R-6) 
Appellant alleged in her Complaint as follows: 
"2. That prior to the 9th day of July, 1947, 
the Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation, con-
structed a baseball park, together with a grand-
stand for the use of spectators, and other fa-
cilities, on land owned by it in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, known as 'Derk's Field' or 'Derk's Ball 
Park,' and on and prior to the said 9th day of 
July, 1947, the said Defendant City has owned 
and operated said park, in its proprietary capac-
ity, said Defendant City sharing the proceeds 
from the operation and use of said park in the 
staging of baseball games and other sports events, 
being played and held therein from time to time, 
including the proceeds of the baseball game here-
inafter specifically referred to. 
"3. That on the 9th day of July, 1947, while 
said park .was being jointly operated, controlled, 
used and maintained by all of the Defendants, 
Plaintiff paid admission for, and attended a base-
ball game being played in said Park, that had 
been advertised publicly by the Defendants, by 
and between a baseball team known as 'Pinney 
Beverage Baseball Team,' owned and controlled 
by the Defendant, Kenneth J. Pinney, and the 
'Provo Baseball Team,' owned and controlled by 
the Defendant, Provo City Baseball Club. 
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'~.t. That Plaintiff, upon entering the stands 
of said Derk's Field, selected a seat about 15 feet 
behind and in the center of the screened portion of 
the grandstand, \Yhich she considered and 
assumed to be, and \Yhieh she selected as being, 
in a place of safety, and \vhere she could not be 
injured by batted or thrown balls. That during 
the fourteenth inning of said baseball game, one 
of the Pinney Beverage Company ball players hit 
a foul ball which went over the said screen in 
front of said grandstand, and struck claimant on 
the base of her neck, fracturing the spinus pro-
cess of her sixth and seventh cervical vertabrae, 
causing her excruciating pain and suffering, and 
permanent injuries and damages, as hereinafter 
more specifically set forth. 
"5. That said Defendant, Salt Lake City 
Corporation was negligent in its construction and 
maintenance of the said Derk's Field, and in 
authorizing and permitting the use thereof while 
not having a screen in front of said grandstand, 
and Plaintiff's seat, of sufficient height, or of 
sufficient overhead covering, so as to prevent 
batted balls from going over said screen and 
striking Plaintiff, and the said Defendants, Ken-
neth J. Pinney and the Provo City Baseball Club, 
were likewise negligent in using said field in its 
dangerous condition, which said facts were well 
known to said Defendants, or should have been 
known to them, in the exercise of reasonable care, 
and in permitting Plaintiff to be injured by a 
batted ball, after being lulled into a sense of 
security by reason of said screen. That the negli-
gence of the Defendants, and each of them, as 
aforesaid, proximately caused Plaintiff's said 
. . . InJUries. 
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"6. That Plaintiff has been caused to suffer 
great pain and shock, and she will continue to 
suffer great pain and shock, and she has been 
totally disabled from performing her household 
and other duties, and will be so disabled for a 
long period of time, and Plaintiff is informed, and 
upon information and belief alleges, that the 
injuries received by her will be permanent in 
character, and she will be permanently disabled 
for the rest of her lifetime, ·all to her general 
damage in the sum of ,$25,000.00, and by reason 
of Plaintiff's injuries, as aforesaid, she has, to 
date hereof, incurred. the following expenses: A 
brace for her back and neck, at a cost of $175.00, 
and doctor and medical expenses in the sum of 
over $400.00. 
"7. That within the time, and as provided by 
law, Plaintiff caused a claim, in writing, properly 
itemized and described and verified as to cor-
rectness, to be presented to the Defendant, Salt 
Lake City Corporation, setting forth the par-
ticulars hereinabove set forth, and claiming 
damages, as aforsaid, and said Defendant City 
has wholly failed to audit and allow the same. 
"WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays Judgment 
against the Defendant, and each of them, both 
jointly and severally, for the sum of $175.00, the 
cost of said brace for her back and neck, the sum 
of $400.00, doctor and medical expenses, and the 
sum of $25,000.00 general damages, for her costs 
of suit herein expended, and for such other and 
further relief as is just and proper." (R-1) 
The Respondent filed a general and special Demur-
rer to Appellant's Complaint, which said Demurrers were 
argued and overruled by the Court. The Respondent 
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filed its .A.ns"'"er ad1nitting that Respondent ·Salt Lake 
City constructed the Baseball Park and Grandstand· for 
the use of spectators, on land O\Yned by it, known as 
Derk's Field, but denied all other allegations of Appel-
lant's Complaint. 
.. A .. s a further Answer to the Complaint, Respondent 
alleged that if Appellant was injured as alleged in her 
Complaint, that her injury was proximately contributed 
to and caused by her own negligence .in failing to keep 
a proper lookout for the ball; in failing to use reasonable 
care and circumspection in attending to her own safety; 
in failing to do anything to protect herself or to avoid 
being hit by said ball after she knew, or by the exercise 
of reasonable care should have known, said ball was 
likely to go over the screen and fall in the vicinity where 
she was sitting. 
Respondent further alleged that the height and char-
acter of the screen in front of the grandstand where 
Appellant claimed she was sitting when injured was at 
all times open and visible and its height and character 
readily discernable by Appellant, and the fact that foul 
balls could be batted over the screen and fall in the 
grandstand was as readily perceivable to her as to Res-
ponden~, and that Appellant chose said seat and re-
mained in said seat assuming whatever risk of injury 
would be encountered in the ordinary and usual course 
of the game of baseball then being played, well knowing 
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the height and character of the screen in front of her 
and the extent of the protection such screen would 
afford. (R-4) 
The case came on for pre-trial before the Court and 
from the pleadings in the cause and statements of 
counsel the Trial Court, Judge J. Allan Crockett pre-
siding, made its Findings and Order as follows: 
"This matter having come before the Court 
for pre-trial, Plaintiff appearing by and through 
Oscar W. Moyle, Jr., of the firm of l\{oyle & Moyle, 
her attorneys, the Defendant, Salt Lake City Cor-
poration appearing by and through E. Ray Chris-
tensen, Homer Holmgren, and A. Pratt Kesler, 
its attorneys, and the Defendant, Kenneth J. 
Pinney appearing by and through E. R. Callister, 
of the firm of Callister, Callister & Lewis, his 
attorneys, and from the pleadings in this cause, 
and statements of counsel, the Court makes its 
Findings and Order as follows: 
"1. That the Defendant, Salt Lake City Cor-
poration, is a municipal corporation duly organ-
ized and existing under and by virtue of the Laws 
of the State of Utah. 
"2. That prior to July 9, 1947, Defendant 
constructed a baseball park with grandstand and 
bleachers and other facilities for use of spectators 
on land owned by it, said park being known as 
'Derk's Field'. That in constructing said baseball 
park Defendant City erected a mesh wire screen 
immediately in front of the front seats of said 
grandstand and about thirty-five feet behind the 
home plate of the baseball diamond in said park, 
said screen being thirty-two feet high and one 
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hundred fifty feet long, the center thereof being 
immediately behind said home plate. Said screen 
'vas erected by Defendant City to afford protec-
tion to spectators vie,ving baseball games from 
batted and thro""n baseballs that otherwise would 
enter that portion of the stand behind the screen. 
Photographs of said screen and stand are intro-
duced in evidence as exhibits 1, 2, and 3. 
"3. For the purpose of this Pre-trial pro-
ceeding the Court finds that prior to July 9, 1947, 
and after the construction of said park as above 
described, Defendant City leased the said park 
to two baseball teams, one sponsored by Pinney 
Beverage Company, and one by Provo City Base-
ball Club, for use by them for baseball games on 
certain scheduled days when the park was not 
otherwise in use. That by the terms of said lease 
said ball teams were to pay to Defendant City 
as rental seven and a half per cent of the gross 
income from the sale of admission tickets, and for 
a license to conduct concessions, such as sale of 
refreshments, soft drinks, beer, and other articles, 
at said park said teams were to pay seven and a 
half per cent of the gross income from such con-
cessions. It was further agreed that said teams 
would collect for Defendant City five cents upon 
each admission ticket to the game. Should this 
Order of dismissal be reversed on Appeal, then 
either party may offer additional evidence on the 
matters in this paragraph 3. 
"4. That on July 9, 1947, Plaintiff paid 
admission for and attended a baseball game being 
played by said Pinney Beverage Company team 
and Provo City Baseball Club team, which game 
had been publically advertized. 
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"5. That·· Plaintiff, upon entering the stands 
of said 'Derk's Field', and desiring and intending 
to view said game from a place of safety, selected 
a seat about 15 feet behind and in the center of 
the screened portion of the grandstand, which 
she considered and assumed to be, and which she 
selected as being in· a place of safety, where she 
could not be injured by batted or thrown balls. 
That during the fourteenth inning of said baseball 
gan1e one of the Pinney Beverage Company ball 
players hit a foul ball, which went up over the 
said screen in front of said grandstand and came 
down inside said screen and struck claimant on 
the base and back of her neck, causing her serious 
and substantial damage. 
"6. That Plaintiff claims in this case that 
Salt Lake City Corporation was negligent in its 
construction and ·maintenance of the Ball Park, 
and in authorizing and permitting the use thereof 
while not having a screen in front of said grand-
stand and Plaintiff's seat, of sufficient height or 
of sufficient over head covering so as to prevent 
batted . balls from going over said screen and 
striking Plaintiff, and in permitting Plaintiff to 
be injured by a batted ball after being lulled into 
a sense of security by reason of the screen; and 
that the negligence of the Defendant City proxi-
mately caused Plaintiff's injuries. 
"7. That Plaintiff further claims that in 
the operation of said Ball Park, it was the duty of 
the City to have a reasonable number of protected 
seats so that those patrons, including Plaintiff, 
who desired a protected seat, could select ·such a 
protected seat, where they, and she, would be in 
a place of safety and a place where they, and she, 
would be protected from injury. 
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"8. That Defendant City claims the City 
had discharged any duty it owed to Plaintiff in 
the premises by constructing and providing the 
screen above described; that the height and char-
acter of said screen in front of the granstand 
"""here Plaintiff was sitting when injured, was at 
all times open and visible and its height and 
character were as readily discernable by Plaintiff 
as by the Defendant City, and the fact that foul 
balls could be batted over said screen and fall in 
the grandstand was as readily perceivable to 
Plaintiff as to the Defendant City, and that 
Plaintiff was equally aware thereof, as was De-
fendant City, and that Plaintiff chose her seat 
and remained in said seat, assuming whatever 
risk of injury would be encountered in the ordi-
nary and usual course of the game of baseball 
then being played, well knowing the height and 
character of the screen in front of her, and the 
extent of the protection the screen would afford. 
"9. That on August 12, 1947, Plaintiff pre-
sented to and filed with Defendant City a written 
claim as set out in Exhibit 'A' attached hereto. 
That Defendant City has failed to audit and 
allow said claim. 
"10. The Court finds as a matter of Law 
that in so far as Defendant City was under any 
legal obligation to furnish protection to Plaintiff 
as a patron at said ball game Defendant City 
discharged such duty by providing the protective 
screen described in paragraph two hereof, and 
Defendant City was not guilty of any negligence 
in the premises toward Plaintiff, and that Plain-
tiff, as a matter of Law, assumed any risk because 
of inadequate protection to spectators. 
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"11. The Court concludes that Plaintiff's 
complaint should be dismissed no cause of action, 
the Plaintiff to have her exceptions to these 
Findings and Order. 
"BY ORDER OF THE COURT made this 
28th day of December 1950. 
"J. ALLAN CROCKETT 
Judge" 
"ORDER" 
"Upon the above Findings and Order, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Plaintiff's com-
plaint . be, and the same hereby is, dismissed 
without prejudice. 
"BY ORDER OF THE COURT made this 
28th day of December 1950. 
"J. ALLAN CROCKETT 
Judge" 
(R-7) 
From the Order made and entered as aforesaid, 
dismissing her Complaint, Appellant has taken this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH AP-
PELLANT INTENDS TO RELY. 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING RESPON-
DENT AS A MATTER OF LAW DISCHARGED IT'S DUTY 
TO APPELLANT BY FURNISHING THE SCREEN DES-
CRIBED IN THE FINDINGS ON PRE-TRIAL. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
APPELLANT AS A MATTER OF LAW ASSUMED THE 
RISK OF THE INJURIES RECEIVED BY HER. 
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3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING AP-
PELLANTS COMPLAINT. 
4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUB-
MIT THE CASE TO THE JURY TRIAL DEMANDED. 
There are two main issues raised by Appellant's 
appeal in this case: 
1. Did Respondent, as a matter of law, discharge 
its duty to the Appellant as a patron at said ball game 
by providing the screen described in the above Find-
ings J? (R-7-10) 
2. Did Appellant, as a matter of law, assume the 
risk of the inadequacy of the protection when, as found 
by the Court she, desiring and intending to view the 
game from a place of safety, selected a seat about 
fifteen feet behind and in the center of the screened 
portion of the grandstand, which she considered and 
assumed to be, and which she selected as being in a 
place of safety where she could not be injured by batted 
or thrown balls~ (R-8-10) 
These issues raise the questions as to the duty of 
the owner and operator of a baseball park to protect its 
patrons, and the duty of the patrons and spectators 
with regard to their own safety. 
THE ARGUMENT 
DID RESPONDENT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, DIS-
CHARGE ITS DUTY BY FURNISHING THE SCREEN FUR-
NISHED. 
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There are many cases where the Appellate Courts of 
the various states have been called upon to p.ass upon 
some phase of the duty imposed upon the owner and the 
assumption of risk on the part of the spectator. The 
general rule drawn from a careful study of the cases is 
that the owners and operators of baseball parks, in 
view of the dangers to spectators from thrown or batted 
balls, owe a duty of providing seats protected by screens 
or otherwise for as many patrons as may be reasonably 
expected to call for such seats on an ordinary day of 
reasonable attendance, and that a breach of this duty 
may constitute_ negligence making the owner or operator 
answerable in damages to a patron who is injured by 
reason of the failure to provide such protection. Said 
general rule is stated in 52 Am. Jur. page 309 as follows: 
"In view of the dangers to spectators at 
baseball games from thrown or batted balls, the 
duties of owners and operators of ball parks to 
exercise care commensurate with the circum-
stances for the protection of their patrons include 
the duty of providing seats protected by screens 
or otherwise for as many patrons as may be 
reasonably expected to call for such seats on an 
ordinary day of reasonable attendance, and the 
breach ·of this duty may constitute negligence 
making the owner or management answerable in 
damages to a patron who is injured by reason of 
the failure to provide such prote.ction. The duty 
of providing such protection is not satisfied where 
the screening provided contains holes or is other-
wise so defective as to provide no stop for 
flying balls." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
Probably the leading and n1ost cited case propound-
ing the general rule referred to in A1n. Jttlr. Supra, is 
the case of Crane vs. Kainsas City Baseball & Exhibition 
Co., 168 Mo. App. 301, 153 S. W. 1076, which we quote 
from as follows: 
HDefendants were not insurers of the safety of 
spectators; but, being engaged in the business of 
providing a public entertainment for profit, they 
were bound to exercise reasonable care, i.e., care 
commensurate to the circumstances of the situation 
to protect their patrons against injury. King. v. 
Ringling, 145 Mo. App. 285, 130 S. W. 482; Mur-
riel v. Smith, 152 Mo. App. 95, 133 S. W. 76. In 
view of the facts that the general public is invited 
to attend these games, that hard balls are thrown 
and batted with great force and swiftness, and 
that such balls often go in the direction of spec-
tators, we think the duty of defendants towards 
their patrons included that of providing seats 
protected by screening from wildly thrown or 
foul balls, for the use of patrons who desired 
such protection." 
Following the Crane case, the same Court in the 
case of Edling vs. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition 
Co., 181 Mo. App. 327, 168 S. W. 908,. affirmed the same 
rule, and in holding the owner of a baseball park liable 
for injuries to a patron where a foul ball passed through 
a large hole that had been worn in the netting and struck 
the patron in the face while seated in the screened-in 
portion of the stand beyond the catcher's box, the 
Court said: 
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"Defendant recognized this duty by screen-
ing that part of the grand stand most exposed to 
the battery of foul balls, and impliedly assured 
spectators who paid admission to the grand stand 
that seats behind the screen were reasonably pro-
tected. None of those seats were closed to pa-
trons, and when plaintiff entered the grand stand 
he was invited to seat himself where he pleased, 
with the assurance that reasonable care had been 
observed for his protection. It was the duty of 
defendant to exercise reasonable care to keep 
the screen free from defects, and, if it allowed it 
to become old, rotten, and perforated with holes 
larger than a ball, the jury were entitled to infer 
that it did not properly perform that duty, but 
was guilty of negligence. 
"In seating himself where he did plaintiff 
did not assume the risks resulting from such 
negligence." 
S·ee also Quinn vs. Recreation Park Association, 
3 Cal. 2d 725, 46 Pac. 2d 144, at page 146 of the Pacific 
report of the case: "The duty imposed by law is per-
formed when screened seats are provided for as many 
as may be reasonably expected to call for them on any 
ordinary occasion." And the cases cited in the 
Annotation appearing at 142 L. R. A. at page 868. 
Appellant takes the position that the Respondent 
did not, as a matter of law, discharge the duty placed 
upon it to provide a reasonable number of screened seats; 
in fact, it did not provide any seats that were reasonably 
protected from foul balls for persons who desired such 
protection, as did Appellant. Certainly, if a patron 
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selects a seat in a grandstand, in the center, and within 
15 feet of the screen, and that person can still be struck 
by a foul ball, the operator of the park has not furnished 
any seats that are reasonably safe, and certainly not so 
as a matter of la"'"· The sufficiency of the protection 
afforded .. A._ppellant under all of the surrounding cir-
cumstances was a question of fact to be determined by 
the jury, not one of law. 
Under the uniform holding of all of the baseball 
cases, it is necessary to furnish a reasonable number of 
safe seats for the use of patrons who desire such pro-
tection, and here, under the express findings of the Court 
upon the pre-trial, Appellant desired such protection, 
the Court having found that Appellant "desiring and 
intending to view said game from a place of safety, 
selected a seat about 15 feet behind and in the center 
of the screened portion of the grandstand which she 
considered and assumed to be, and which she selected 
as being in a place of safety where she could not be 
injured by batted or thrown balls." 
The Trial Court was clearly in error in finding that 
as a matter of law, in so far as Respondent was under 
any legal obligation to furnish protection to Appellant, it 
discharged such duty by providing the screen described 
in said Findings, and that as a matter of law, Respondent 
was not guilty of any negligence in the premises toward 
Appellant. This brings us to the question as to whether 
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or not Appellant, as a matter of law, assumed any risk 
because of inadequate protection to her under the exist-
ing facts as disclosed by the Findings upon the pre-trial. 
DID APPELLANT AS A MATTER OF LAW ASSUME 
THE RISK OF THE INADEQUACY OF THE PROTECTION 
FURNISHED? 
If the Appellant, as a matter of law, assumed the 
risk of being struck by the ball that struck her, she 
certainly did so without so intending. The express 
finding is that she desired and intended to view the 
game from a place of safety, and that she selected the 
seat as being in a place of safety where she could not be 
injured by batted or thrown balls. There is nothing in 
the Findings of the Trial Court on pre-trial upon which 
the Order of Dismissal is based that would indicate that 
Appellant had any reason to believe that she would or 
might be struck by a ball fouled from home plate over 
the screen and into the vicinity of her seat. In fact, as 
stated, the express Finding of the Trial Court was that 
she considered herself to be. in a place of safety. 
Appellant admits that where a patron voluntairly 
selects a seat in an unscreened portion of the grand stand 
at a baseball game, that the cases show a strong tendency 
toward holding that the patron assumes the risk of being 
struck by a ball, at least where the patron has knowledge 
of the game, unless some unusual circumstances exist, 
such as where, in the case of Grimes vs. American 
League Baseball Company, 78 S.W. 2d. 520, the Missouri 
Court of Appeals sustained a judgm~nt for a patron 
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"There the ball struck a temporary box that had been 
placed on the playing field, and the ball was deflected into 
the unscreened stand and struck the patron, the Court 
holding that the construction of boxes within the playing 
field, created an unusual and extroardinary hazard; and 
in the case of Cincinnati Baseball Club vs. Eno, Supra, 
in which case the Court held that it was a question of 
fact for the Jury to determine whether or not the man-
agement of the Baseball Club, in permitting practice 
by its baseball team in close proximity to the unscreened 
section of the grand stand between the two games of a 
double header, was guilty of negligence, and also a ques-
tion of fact for the jury as to whether or not a spectator 
sitting in the unscreened portion of the grand stand at 
the time of the practicing, was guilty of contributory 
negligence or assumed the risk of injury. 
The theory or basis for holding that, as a matter of 
law, a patron assumes the risk of injury by selecting a 
seat in an unscreened portion of the stand is that the 
spectator has knowledge of the dangers incident to the 
playing of the game and therefore, assumes the risk of 
being injured in such a seat regardless of the question 
of negligence on the part of the operator, and in those 
cases in which the Courts have refused recovery where 
the spectator denied actual knowledge of the danger, it 
was held the circumstances surrounding the attendance 
were such, and the game of baseball so commonly known, 
that knowledge was imputed to him. This imputed know-
ledge of danger precluding recovery when struck while 
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voluntarily sitting in an unscreened portion of the stand 
would certainly not be the same as imputing that know-
ledge to the spectator who has voluntarily and intention-
ally selected the safest seat that he is able to find, in a 
portion of the stand considered by him to be in a place 
of safety. The very erection and existence of the screen 
impliedly assures spectators that the seats immediately 
behind the same ar~ reasonably protected. Certainly 
there can be no implication of such protection when 
sitting in an unscreened portion of the stand. 
As stated in the Edling case, Supra: "Defendant 
recognized this duty by screening that part of the grand 
stand most exposed to the battery of foul balls, and 
impliedly assured spectators who paid admission to the 
grand stand that seats behind the screen were reasonably 
protected. None of those seats were closed to patrons, 
and when Plaintiff entered the grand stand he was 
invited to seat himself where he pleased, with the as-
surance that reasonable care had been observed for 
his protection." 
In refusing to apply the doctrine of implying com-
mon knowledge of the game and its incidental dangers 
and of assumed risk as a matter of law in baseball cases 
where struck by a ball while in an unscreened portion of 
the stand to a hockey game, the Supreme Court of the 
State of Nebraska, after carefully considering the base-
ball, former hockey and other amusement cases, in the 
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case of Tite vs. Omaha Coliseum Corp. 12 N. W. 2d. 90, 
149 A. L. R. 1164, at page 1171 of the A. L. R. report 
of the case states: 
''Seemingly the tendency of the courts is to 
hold that in all baseball cases involving injuries 
to spectators from balls going into the unscreened 
stands from the playing field the question of 
knowledge, either actual or constructive, is one 
of law for the courts. While in some cases there 
was evidence that would show knowledge, the 
courts in deciding that the spectator had know-
ledge as a matter of law emphasized the fact that 
there is a common knowledge of baseball and its 
incidental dangers. This common kno~ledge 
seems to have been the deciding factor in causing 
the courts to view the question as one of law for 
the court rather than one of fact for the jury. 
The distinction which appellant perceives in base-
ball cases does not show a different rule of sub-
stantive law as respects the duties of the operator 
or spectator. It merely shows establishment of 
knowledge of dangers which precludes recovery 
is arrived at in a different manner." 
Appellant contends that the doctrine of implied risk 
as a matter of law should not be extended to cover the 
factual situation existing in the case at bar, and particu-
larly so in the face of the affirmative finding by the 
Trial Court that Appellant selected the seat 15 feet 
behind the screen considering the same to be in a place 
of safety and where she could not be injured by batted 
or thrown balls. This Finding of the Trial Court is 
entirely contrary to the presuming of knowledge that 
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she was voluntarily choosing a place of danger. The 
reasons behind applying the assumed risk doctrine to a 
spectator voluntarily selecting a seat in an open portion 
of the stand do not in any way apply to a patron who 
selects a seat behind the screen for the express purpose 
of placing herself in a position of safety. Certainly, at 
the most, it would be for the jury, which had been 
demanded by Appellant in this cause, to determine the 
question of whether -or not, _ under all of the circum-
stances, she assumed the risk of receiving the injuries 
she received, and not a question of law for the Trial 
Court to determine. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant submits that the Court 
erred: First, in finding as a matter of law that Respon-
dent was not guilty of any negligence; and Second, that 
Appellant, as a matter of law, assumed any risk because 
of inadequate protection to her ; and respectfully requests 
that the Order dismissing Plaintiff's complaint be re-
versed, and this cause be remanded to the Trial Court for 
trial upon its merits before a jury. 
OSCAR W. MOYLE, JR., 
Of the Firm of Moyle & Moyle 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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